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Hua in London

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CAN WASHINGTON DELIVER SETTLEMENTS IN NAMIBIA, RHODESIA?

U.S. On the Spot in Southern Africa

Will President Carter risk repeat performances of the Camp David summit to seek negotiated settlements to the wars in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Namibia? The State Department has floated the idea, although the strong possibility that such southern Africa summits would fail may convince Carter not to intercede directly. In Los Angeles last week, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith—dodging demonstrators and drumming up support for his “internal settlement”—said he would welcome a Camp David-type conference. At the same time, in Pretoria, South Africa's new ultra-rightwing Prime Minister Pieter Botha indicated he would accept an invitation from President Carter, personally delivered by Secretary of State Vance, to visit Washington to discuss Namibia and other issues.

Whether Carter ventures another Camp David or pursues more conventional diplomacy, it is clear that the administration needs a breakthrough to salvage its southern Africa strategy. In the cases of Namibia and Rhodesia, the United States has stretched its credibility with black leaders in Africa as far as it can. Ever since Henry Kissinger launched his shuttle diplomacy in southern Africa in 1976, Washington has counselled African countries to be patient while the U.S. and other Western powers secure South Africa's cooperation in arranging peaceful settlements leading to majority rule in Namibia and Rhodesia. But virtually no progress has been made. The wars have escalated, Smith has tried to impose his own inadequate internal solution,

and South Africa is more intransigent than ever.

South Africa's rejection of the Western-devised UN settlement plan for Namibia has particularly embarrassed the United States. Painstakingly negotiated over the last 18 months by the U.S. deputy representative to the UN, Donald McHenry, in consultation with West Germany, Britain, France and Canada, the plan was hailed in the West as an outstanding diplomatic achievement. It was the Western powers' alternative to the demands by African nations for economic sanctions against the apartheid regime. *Business Week*, which staunchly opposes an embargo, acknowledged October 9 that now the “call for sanctions against South Africa cannot easily be turned back.” The magazine raised the specter of rapidly escalating Soviet-Cuban involvement and reported that Washington is “working feverishly . . . to avoid the kind of showdown in southern Africa that would force the U.S. to choose between its political and economic interests among the black states and those in white-ruled South Africa.”

To try to avert that showdown, Secretary of State Vance joined his counterparts from Britain, West Germany and Canada and the French deputy foreign minister in Pretoria last week for an intense round of negotiations with South Africa's white-minority leaders on the future of Namibia. The outcome did nothing to resolve the future of Namibia. South Africa agreed

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WILL THE CEASE-FIRE LAST?

Lebanon: Down So Long...

Once again this month, Lebanon edged toward the brink of civil war, saved only by a fragile cease-fire called by Syria on October 7. Arab foreign ministers met in emergency session October 15-17 in an effort to reinforce the uneasy truce that halted the escalating warfare in Beirut between right-wing Christian militias and Syrian forces of the Arab Deterrence Force (ADF). Six Arab nations which contribute troops or money to the ADF called for a strengthened Lebanese government, a rebuilt Lebanese army, and the collection of arms from private armies. But without imaginative steps to resolve the deep political crisis in Lebanon, these measures are no more likely to be implemented now than they were after the civil war two years ago.

The alternative, as Arab and Western nations know, could well be a new conflagration—one that would probably involve not only Syria and the Christian rightists, but Moslem leftists, Palestinians—and Israel. Already this month, before the latest cease-fire, there were several ominous signs: Israeli gunboats and Syrian shore batteries engaged in a 90-minute coastal duel; Christian shelling spread to Moslem west Beirut for the first

time since the civil war; and reports spread that Syria was bringing units of the Palestine Liberation Army back to Beirut to aid in security.

Lebanon remains unbalanced on the edge of a new, devastat-

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Syrian soldier in Beirut: more war?

Lebanon

[continued from page 1]

ing civil war because no solution has been found either to the deep political disputes that divide the country or to the larger Arab-Israeli conflict which strongly influences events in Lebanon.

The 1975-76 civil war—which pitted Christian rightists against Moslem leftists and their Palestinian allies—ended without a decisive victory for either side. It was terminated because Saudi Arabia used its considerable influence with both Syria and the PLO to stop the fighting, and because Syrian troops moved into Beirut to enforce a cease-fire backed up by key Arab nations. Lebanon's problems were not solved; they were postponed.

The civil war left Lebanon—a country the size of Connecticut with 3 million people—effectively partitioned into Christian and Moslem zones. The unequal distribution of political and economic power in favor of the Christian minority—a key factor underlying the hostilities of the civil war—remains. The central government is virtually powerless, because it is made up of technocrats who have no political, religious or personal base. President Elias Sarkis, a Christian who took office with Syrian backing in 1976, has attempted twice this year to persuade traditional political leaders to enter the government. They refused, since they do not even agree on whether Lebanon should have a strong central government.

Efforts by Sarkis to build a new national army loyal to the government have met a similar fate. The Christian-dominated Lebanese army disintegrated during the civil war, with units and soldiers going off to join various warring factions. Sarkis hoped to rebuild a unified, Moslem-Christian army that could ultimately replace the largely Syrian Arab Deterrent Force which was charged with establishing security in Lebanon after the civil war. But the army remains small, Christian-dominated and



East Beirut ruins following latest fighting

ineffective.

Lebanon is still deeply divided along religious, political and sectarian lines. The various factions—many of which have heavily armed private militias—often command greater loyalty than does the state. Attempts to disarm the militias after the war failed, and since then they have acquired newer, heavier weapons.

The major forces in Lebanon's internal disputes include:

- The Maronite Christians, who are traditionally pro-Western and are convinced they are the only true Lebanese. The right-wing Maronite activists are grouped in two main organizations: the largest is the Phalangist party of Pierre Gemayel. Allied with the Phalangists in a rightist coalition known as the Lebanese Front is the National Liberal Party headed by former president Camille Chamoun.

The right-wing Maronite groups, which represent only a fraction of the Maronite community, believe they won the civil war and claim the right to dictate the shape of post-war Lebanon. They seek decentralization or some other form of partition that preserves their autonomy in Christian areas. They also insist that the Syrians be expelled by Christmas, and they want the Palestinians in Lebanon resettled in other Arab countries. Underlying their actions is the fear that in a unified Lebanon they would lose political power to the Moslem majority—especially if the Moslems were backed up by the Palestinians. Their hostility to the Palestinians has been reinforced by the alliance which the Maronites have forged with Israel.

The Maronite right wing is generally blamed for provoking the latest fighting in an effort to prevent Pres. Sarkis from renewing the mandate of the Syrian peacekeeping force when it expires October 26. Although they took a terrible beating in east Beirut, the right-wing Christians remain defiant, claiming they would rather see "Lebanon destroyed, but free" of the Syrians.

- The Moslem majority, much but not all of which is leftist. With crucial support from the Palestinians, the Moslem left seemed on the verge of winning the civil war, until Syria intervened to turn the tide in favor of the Christian rightists. The Moslems are fragmented into many groups and were further weakened by the assassination last year of their main leader, Kamal Jumblatt. Since the war, the Moslems have stayed out of the fighting. However, they are allied politically with the Syrians and some pro-Syrian Christians against the right-wing Maronites. The Moslems gained virtually nothing from the war and favor a strong central government that would give them equal power with the Christians.

- The Palestinians, whose presence in Lebanon is estimated at 400,000. Lebanon is the last sanctuary of the PLO, following its expulsion from Jordan in 1970. At first during the civil war, the Palestinians played a peacekeeping role, but ultimately they became the backbone of the Moslem leftist fighting force. After the 1976 ceasefire, they were pressured to return to their refugee camps and to the southeastern corner of Lebanon known as "Fatahland"—although Israel has continually attempted to remove them from the border area.

Lebanon's internal disputes have become all the more intractable because they are reinforced by the larger Arab-Israeli conflict.

- Israel struck an alliance with the right-wing Christian militias in the spring of 1976, before the civil war was over. The Israelis began arming and training breakaway Christian units of the Lebanese army in the south. Israel's goal was to create a friendly buffer zone along the Lebanese border, and to prevent the return of Palestinian commandos to their traditional bases in the south when the war ended. Israeli-Christian collaboration, at first kept secret, escalated this year when Israel occupied southern Lebanon. When the Israelis left, they turned over the buffer zone along the border, not to UN forces as they were asked to do, but to right-wing Christian militias. In addition, Israel has repeatedly warned Syria not to move south of the Litani River.

Israel also supplies arms and training to Christian militias in the north to prevent the extension of Syrian influence in Lebanon. Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan said earlier this month that Israel is "obliged to extend" to the Christians "as much help as we can." The threat of wider Israeli involvement has so far prevented the Syrians from launching a decisive attack on the right-wing militias

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PYRAMID FEVER

Cashing In On Peace

While Egyptian and Israeli negotiators were working out the details of a peace treaty in Washington last week, officials in Israel were updating plans for joint economic projects with Egypt that were drafted following President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem a year ago and then shelved when relations between the two countries chilled earlier this year. Those plans include an Israeli proposal to create a Middle East common market that would involve Israel, Egypt and other conservative Arab states and Iran. Another project would involve joint Egyptian-Israeli operation of two nuclear power plants to be built in the Sinai at a cost of about \$1 billion. And there is a proposal for mutual exploitation of underground water supplies below the Sinai desert.

"Pyramid fever" has hit in Israel where thousands of Israelis already have signed up for tours of Egypt in anticipation of normalized relations following the signing of a peace treaty. But for the average Egyptian, whose annual income is about 8% that of an Israeli's, hopes for peace are more modest and more likely to go unfulfilled. Ninety percent of Egypt's 40 million people are poor and most Egyptian

economists expect them to stay that way for a long time after a peace treaty is signed. Experts predict that Egypt's \$3.3 billion defense budget—which is 24% of the country's \$13.5 billion GNP—will not decline in future years, but will simply stabilize at about that level. A massive demobilization of the Egyptian armed forces would simply pour more unskilled laborers onto the job market, further exacerbating Egypt's already immense unemployment problem.

Outside aid to Egypt—now running at about \$3 billion a year, including \$2 billion from Arab states, primarily Saudi Arabia, and \$900 million from the U.S.—may decline if peace holds between Egypt and Israel. Egypt will be expanding its oil production and could even earn foreign exchange from sale of that oil to Israel as exports are expanded. Tourism and potential trade between Israel and Egypt could also provide additional revenue for Egypt to meet its worsening economic crisis. But that trade in the first year after a peace treaty would reach a maximum of \$100 million each way, according to the estimates of a joint Egyptian-Israeli committee established after the Sadat initia-

tive. This would be a small fraction of the current total exports of each country, which last year amounted to about \$3.5 billion for Israel and \$2.5 billion for Egypt.

Egyptians hoping for a peace dividend may find that they will have to join what the Israeli Ministry of Finance estimates could be up to one million Egyptians seeking work in Tel Aviv. Or they could be among those recruited to work in what the *Jerusalem Post* speculated could be Israeli-owned factories set up in Egypt "to profit from the large cheap labor market."

For the Israelis, it is also unlikely that a peace treaty with Egypt will bring major short-term economic benefits. The Israeli defense budget—which takes 31% of Israel's GNP—is not expected to be reduced, primarily because of the cost of building new installations to replace those dismantled in the Sinai and because Israel will continue to have hostile relations with neighbors other than Egypt. There are also predictions of new inflation in Israel—already running about 40%—as a result of a serious housing shortage and resulting construction boom to accommodate both resettled Sinai settlers and Egyptian laborers.

—BANNING GARRETT


in Beirut. For Israel, the continued fighting in Lebanon also serves to drain and divert the energies of the PLO and Syria.

• Syria has played a complex role in Lebanon. At the start of the civil war, President Hafez al-Assad aided the Moslem leftists. Then, in a dramatic turnaround, Syria entered the war in June 1976 to save the right-wing Christians from defeat. Finally in November 1976—after Saudi Arabia and other Arab states decided to put a stop to the fighting—Syrian troops were given an Arab mandate to stay in Lebanon and act as a peacekeeping force. Syria then began to play a more balanced role. Its aims were to enforce the ceasefire, disarm the private militias, and help restore the authority of the Syrian-influenced Sarkis government.

At first, the Syrians restricted the Palestinian presence and role in Lebanon. But Assad began to relax his pressure on the PLO in response to two developments. The first was the continuing Israeli and Christian militia attacks on Palestinians returning to southern Lebanon. The second was Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's peace initiative in November 1977, which drove Syria and the PLO into a new, anti-Sadat alliance.

Meanwhile, strains developed between

Syria and the right-wing militias. Among the chief factors was Syria's anger over the growing Christian alliance with Israel and the Christians' refusal to relinquish authority in their areas to Syria or the Sarkis government. The PLO-Syrian alliance also angered the Christians. Skirmishes began early this year, with large-scale clashes in February, July and early October. The Chamounists have now declared a "war of national liberation" against the Syrians.



Although Syria has switched tactics repeatedly in Lebanon, its underlying aims appear consistent. First, Assad is determined to prevent the partition of Lebanon, since it would most likely produce an Israeli-dominated Christian state. Secondly, Syria has sought to prevent the creation of a militant left-wing government that would turn Lebanon into a confrontation state, possibly drawing Syria into an unwanted war with Israel. Finally, Assad has tried to bring the PLO under Syrian control. At times, he has tried to moderate the PLO's stand and curb its raids against Israel in hopes of opening peace talks. At other times, he has allowed the PLO to step up its operations as a threat to the Israelis. In general, Assad seems to want to use what control he has over the PLO to strengthen his own hand in bargaining with Israel and with other Arabs.

Syria says it will not leave Lebanon unless the Christian militias are disarmed. Otherwise, Syrian departure would, by most estimates, plunge Lebanon back into civil war. Increasingly, however, it appears that with or without the Syrians, Lebanon is on the verge of a war that could be even more destructive than the last, which cost 60,000 lives.

—JAN AUSTIN

"HEY, THIS THING CAN'T LAST LONG"

U.S., Latin America & Human Rights

WASHINGTON — Twenty-one months into the Carter presidency, the administration's human rights policy as applied to Latin America is under attack, especially by U.S. business leaders and Pentagon officials. Supporters of the policy in the State Department say intelligence reports indicate that U.S. pressures on Latin American governments to improve human rights conditions have been successful in getting hundreds of political prisoners freed, cutting down on instances of torture, and encouraging a movement towards democratic elections. But at Senate hearings on U.S.-Latin American relations held earlier this month, critics questioned the policy's effectiveness, claiming it has alienated valuable allies and adversely affected U.S. commercial relations with key Latin American countries.

The "human rights" policy in question is a hodgepodge of administration directives, and congressional amendments tying U.S. aid to human rights practices in recipient countries. In the 21 months since Carter became President, a network of human rights officials in key government agencies has been created to implement the policy, and especially to decide if a particular government's human rights practices qualify it for U.S. assistance. A special Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in the State Department under Assistant Secretary Patricia Derian oversees this task, along with human rights officials in regional bureaus, and in the National Security Council.



Human rights coordinator Pat Derian

Those most intimately associated with molding the human rights policy agree that from the first, it has been marked by inconsistencies and omissions. One State Department official involved with the policy commented, "Just look at the record. Whenever 'national security' and 'human rights' concerns come into con-

flict, as in South Korea, what gives? It's only in areas of low strategic importance, and especially where congress has legislated, that the policy gets implemented at all."

Latin America, as opposed to the Philippines or South Korea, fits both these prerequisites. It is generally considered of secondary strategic importance, and Congress has passed specific legislation cutting off aid to some Latin American countries. As a result, Latin America has become the key arena for working out the policy.

But there, too, the policy has been marked by inconsistency. In an attempt to "encourage the positive," for example, President Carter sent Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza a personal letter congratulating him for improving human rights practices, just weeks before Somoza's National Guard killed thousands of civilians in suppressing a popular insurrection. And often aid cutbacks have been more than compensated for by a surge in private bank lending, which the administration claims it cannot control.

Still, whatever the policy's weaknesses, it has been forcefully applied in the following cases:

- **Chile:** There is currently a congressionally mandated ban on almost all aid and on commercial military sales to Chile, and the administration is voting against loans for Chile from the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank. The freeze is aimed at "encouraging" the government to give an accounting for the "disappeared persons" and at getting cooperation on the Letelier assassination case. "Pipeline" shipments of large amounts of military equipment bought before the 1976 freeze continue.

- **Argentina:** All military assistance and commercial military sales to Argentina were stopped as of September 30, as mandated by a congressional amendment passed last year after intense lobbying by human rights organizations. Before the cutoff took effect, the administration refused to clear about 200 requests to sell more than \$100 million of arms and spare parts to Argentina. Since last June, the administration has voted against three loans sought by Argentina from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and abstained on seven more from the IDB and the World Bank. In addition, a top-level interagency committee entrusted with making aid decisions has deferred action on requests for Export-Import Bank financing for \$300 million in com-

mercial sales to Argentina.

- **Nicaragua:** As of September 22, there has been a freeze on nearly all economic and military aid and on commercial military sales to Nicaragua.

- **Military aid and sales to Paraguay and Uruguay** are also "virtually frozen."

- **Brazil:** Last year, rather than subject itself to a human rights "report card," Brazil rejected all U.S. military aid. But government-financed commercial sales have continued. In general, Brazil has not been affected much by the human rights policy, since the State Department considers the human rights situation there "greatly improved."

- **El Salvador and Guatemala** also rejected military aid last year in protest over unfavorable human rights reports written by the State Department.

- **Economic aid** has been used with varying success as a carrot and a stick to forestall a military coup in the midst of the Dominican Republic's recent presidential elections, and in Bolivia, where the coup occurred anyway.

- Since January 1977, the administration has voted "no" on 11 loans and abstained on 21 loans to human rights violators from international institutions like the World Bank. Often the loans went through anyway.

Critics of these policies got a chance to sound off October 3-6 at hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, chaired by Senator Paul Sarbanes [D-Md.]. James Theberge—former U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua and now president of the Institute for Conflict and Policy Studies in Washington—set the tone for the criticisms when he blasted the human rights policy for its "unacceptable, hectoring self-righteous tenor." While admitting that few presidents had spent as much time on Latin America as President Carter, Theberge charged that "no president has alienated more Latin American countries or adversely affected commercial relations in

THE SUCCESSES

"In Latin America, political prisoners were released in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Argentina, and Peru. The military governments of Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia announced that elections will be held in 1978. States of siege were lifted in El Salvador and Nicaragua. And El Salvador, Haiti, and Paraguay agreed to visits by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission."

Dep. Sec. of State Warren Christopher before the American Bar Association, 2/13/78

so short a time."

Alexander Perry, vice president of the Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America (AACL), have some indication of the impact on trade. Reflecting widespread business dissatisfaction with the policy's effects on U.S. exports, Perry said that although there is no available list of countries or projects where exporting financing or licensing is being blocked because of human rights considerations, "some have estimated the total to be within the range of \$2.5 to \$5 billion." He said the State Department estimates that \$1.25 billion in exports to Argentina alone—including military and non-military items—are being withheld because of the human rights situation there.

Perry and business lobbyists interviewed by Internews are especially irate about the administration's decision to block Export-Import Bank financing for some huge non-military projects. Last summer, the Christopher Committee—the interagency committee headed by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher that makes the decisions on controversial loans—blocked Ex-Im financing for a \$270 million hydroelectric turbine deal between Allis Chalmers and Argentina. The Committee also put off a decision on a request from Boeing on behalf of the Argentine Airline Company for \$68 million from the Ex-Im bank for aircraft purchase. Partly because of business pressure, the Christopher Committee reversed its decision in the Allis Chalmers case late last month and told the Ex-Im Bank to let Argentina know it would consider financing the deal. But, as Perry pointed out in his testimony, \$300 million in other potential Ex-Im-financed commercial sales are still being held up by the committee.

Perry complained to the Sarbanes committee that the only real effect of denying export financing of this sort is to penalize U.S. business. He said that if Allis Chalmers loses the Argentine deal, Japan or Great Britain, or even the Soviet Union, will grab it.

State Department spokespeople told

A WEAKNESS

"A third fundamental weakness [of the human rights policy] is what we have come to call the 'Scharansky syndrome.' When there is a case of human rights violation in one part of the world, the President has often responded by a dramatic action . . . However, there has been a noisy silence about the many Argentines who have finished their sentences, and remain in jail . . ."

Joseph T. Eldridge, Director, Washington Office on Latin America, before the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, 10/5/78

Internews that more and more arms manufacturers are beginning to lobby actively for a change in the human rights policy. Their key lobbying group is ALISA, the American League for International Security Affairs.

In testimony which was more subtle, but equally critical of administration policies, David E. McGiffert, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, told the subcommittee October 5 that the U.S. can no longer accept that preeminent U.S. military influence in Latin America is a "given." He said that because of the "desire of successive administrations, including congress, to cut back the U.S. military presence" in Latin America, major changes have occurred in U.S. military relations with the southern hemisphere. The level of U.S. military sales credits, he said, is "dramatically on the decline." Over the past decade U.S. military personnel have been reduced to about 10 percent of previous levels and the U.S. share of total arms transfers to the region has been reduced to less than 20 percent. With the exception of Panama, the U.S. has no more than six U.S. personnel in any country administering security assistance.

McGiffert suggested that these developments could harm U.S. security interests in Latin America. "At the same time as our influence has decreased, at the same time as our military relationships have diminished," he said, "the strategic importance of Latin America has, if anything, increased." In particular McGiffert mentioned the need to keep open and secure the "south Atlantic sea lines of communication which supply vital oil to the U.S. and NATO allies." "A hostile Latin America," he said, "could require the United States to divert scarce military resources from other priorities to assure U.S. security."

McGiffert echoed, though less explicitly, remarks made in June before House hearings by Rear Admiral Gordon Schuller, who said outright that the U.S. could no longer be sure it had a "secure southern flank."

McGiffert's and Schuller's testimony reportedly reflect defense planners' concern about declining U.S. influence in Argentina and in Brazil. One administration official told Internews that "Pentagon pressure to keep up military sales to Argentina has been fierce." A military officer said that Argentina needs replacement parts especially for its destroyers, "which are almost not functioning because of the lack of spare parts."

Not all of the testimony at the October 3-6 hearings was hostile to administration policy. Joseph Eldridge, director

of the church-supported Washington Office on Latin America, praised the Human Rights Bureau and the administration's willingness to meet with popular Latin American political figures in opposition to their country's military governments. But Eldridge also pointed out failings in the policy, though from a different perspective than Perry or McGiffert. He criticized what he called the "Scharansky syndrome" (see box) and the "backsliding syndrome," that is, the administration's tendency to announce a strong policy and then rescind it, as in the Allis Chalmers case. Eldridge also raised Nicaragua as an example of problems of "timidity and inconsistency" in the policy. He urged Congress and the Administration to disassociate themselves totally from the Somoza government by withdrawing the U.S. military mission and perhaps even calling the ambassador home for "consultation."



Nicaragua: refugees from fighting in Esteli

Another witness, Stanford political scientist Richard Fagen, went further. "Nicaragua is the most important test in the hemisphere to date of the Carter administration's commitment to human rights," he said. Like Eldridge, he urged the administration and Congress to "translate pretty phrases into significant actions" by cutting off all support for Somoza and by getting Israel and other U.S. allies to cut off arms sales to his government. Ultimately, Fagen suggested, "national security" concerns may override elementary human rights in the Nicaragua case, indicating this administration will not risk a real break with the past.

Summarizing the internal inconsistencies and problems of the human rights policies, one government official said, "Look, if you were Somoza, or [Argentine President] Videla, you would look up here and say—hey, this thing can't last long. The Pentagon, the business community, the CIA, and most of the bureaucracy is opposed to the human rights policy. If you were Videla, wouldn't you expect a change in the policy soon?"

—ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH

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"NOT AN ATTEMPT TO TILT THE BALANCE OF POWER"

A controversy over whether Britain should sell arms to China was heightened this month by the visit to London of Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua. The primary issue—which has divided Prime Minister Callaghan's own Labour Party—has been the impact of such sales on British relations with the Soviet Union. Foreign Sec. David Owen tried to downplay the strategic significance of Huang's Oct. 10-14 visit. "We are doing this," he claimed, "not in an attempt to tilt the balance of power or as part of a tactical maneuver, but as an assertion of a fundamental belief that a close relationship between our two countries is not only an inescapable reality but a positive benefit to the world."

Moscow did not fail to appreciate the strategic and military implications of Huang's trip, however. The Soviets warned that supplying arms to China would contradict Britain's commitment to detente. A British Foreign Office spokesperson avoided a direct response to the Soviet statement, saying only that Britain would consider any sales of arms to China in "the light of international obligations and economic and political circumstances prevailing at the time."

The official added that so far China has made no formal request for arms, and that no decision had been taken by the British government about which Chinese requests might be met if they were made. The Chinese, however, have been looking closely at the advanced British Harrier jumpjet fighter bomber and other British weapons systems.

The London *Times* editorially asked Oct. 12 "what must be Europe's answer" to requests for modern arms for China's defense?

The paper answered by saying that although arms sales to China should not be allowed to provoke the Soviet Union, "sales of defensive weapons to China pose no threat to Soviet security but they could marginally and indirectly contribute to western security."

While the British continue to debate the arms sales issue, non-military trade with China is expanding rapidly. Owen said that in the few weeks preceding Huang's visit, British firms signed contracts to sell China about \$300 million worth of mining machinery and other industrial goods. British banking sources in Peking told Reuters Oct. 14 that China has completely reversed its policy on government-to-government loans and is now willing to accept such arrangements to finance the massive purchases of technology it is seeking from the West.

STRIKES, PROTESTS GRIP COUNTRY

Despite last month's crackdown and declaration of martial law, the Shah of Iran is facing a deepening political crisis. A new phase of anti-government protest began in early October when tens of thousands of teachers, government employees, railroad workers, doctors and postal workers went on strike for higher pay. After a general strike was called Oct. 7, many stayed off the job for days. In the city of Isfahan, 30,000 steelworkers reportedly joined the strike movement on Oct. 9, demanding better pay, housing and medical services. And 7,000 workers from the country's largest agribusiness firm threatened to march on Teheran if their demands for better

living conditions and pay were not met. Students have joined the latest wave of protests, boycotting classes in support of striking teachers and shutting down universities across the country. Marches by demonstrating students have led to numerous clashes with police. In downtown Teheran, police opened fire on protesters Oct. 11, killing at least 3. Violent demonstrations have erupted in more than 20 cities this month.

Teheran's two main newspapers were also shut down from Oct. 12-14 to protest attempts by martial law authorities to impose censorship. The government bowed to press demands and issued a three-point statement pledging press freedom.

The *Wall Street Journal* reported Oct. 11 that the government is cutting back expenditures in order to pay for salary raises and other services to placate "nationwide political and labor upheavals." The paper said Iran will suspend some planned purchases of Western nuclear technology. The Iranian opposition has campaigned against the government's nuclear program, charging it is a waste of money and urging that Iran turn instead to its huge natural gas deposits.

On Oct. 16, Teheran's central bazaar and most other shops were shut down by a strike mourning the deaths of protestors shot by troops in the capital 40 days earlier. Although the government put on a massive show of force in the capital, the strike remained peaceful. However, 7 people were reported killed in demonstrations in other cities. Religious leaders have joined the political opposition in appealing to people not to provoke new clashes—reportedly out of a concern that this would encourage the Shah to install a military government.

TASTER'S CHOICE?

Two days after Pres. Carter signed a bill Oct. 10 cutting off U.S. trade with Uganda because Idi Amin's regime engages in "gross violations" of human rights, the Ugandan leader accused neighboring Tanzania of invading his country. Amin's charges were "complete lies," replied Tanzania's Pres. Julius Nyerere. A Tanzanian Foreign Ministry spokesperson added, "Whenever Amin is in trouble, he always looks for a scapegoat." A State Dept. official told *Internews* last week that he agreed with the Tanzanian assessment, "We've seen this kind of behavior from Amin before," he said.

The Carter administration opposed the cut-off of trade with Uganda, but decided not to veto the amendment which was attached to a bill authorizing U.S. participation in a special International Monetary Fund program. Sen. Lowell Weicker [R-Conn.] sponsored the trade ban, which the Senate approved by a vote of 73 to 1. Weicker said the trade embargo showed the world that the United States would no longer be "a partner to genocide." U.S.-Uganda trade totalled \$275 million last year, with U.S. coffee companies purchasing more than one-third of Uganda's crop—the country's main export. Last spring, under congressional pressure, Folgers (Proctor and Gamble), Maxwell House (General Foods), Nestles and Hills Brothers had announced a voluntary embargo against Uganda.

Amnesty International estimates that Amin's regime has been responsible for the deaths of 50,000 to 300,000 Ugandans in a "reign of terror" since Amin seized power in 1971. While not denying that Amin is a brutal tyrant, a number of congressional representatives, including the Black Caucus, favored U.S. support for UN sanctions against Uganda as an alternative to a unilateral U.S. embargo. Caucus members said that Congress was eager to move against Amin, a black dictator, but would not support sanctions against South Africa's apartheid regime. An



Huang Hua

aide to Sen. Weicker told Internews that the case for sanctions against South Africa "is by no means that clear," and he accused Amin of "eating a few [of his victims] for breakfast."

STRIKES AND VIOLENT REPRESSION

The Guatemalan National Council of Labor Unity (CNUS), a powerful and progressive organization of labor unions, called a **guatemala** general strike earlier this month to protest an increase of bus fares from 5 to 10 cents. CNUS said workers' wages were too low to pay the fare. They were joined in protesting the increase by students and by townspeople in Guatemala City and other provincial centers. After a week of riots, and attacks on demonstrators by police as well as paramilitary groups dressed in civilian clothes, at least 24 people were dead—some reports said the figure will go much higher—and 300 wounded. On Oct. 7, the Guatemala City municipal council voted to rescind the 5 cent increase, but the strike continued, especially among state workers. They were demanding that people detained during the strike be released, that workers fired during the strike be rehired, and that they receive payment for salaries lost during the demonstrations. On Oct. 11, police fired on hundreds of striking city hall and social security employees sitting outside buildings waiting to stage a demonstration. Nine people were wounded and hundreds arrested.

Meanwhile, police forces were reinforced throughout Guatemala after an attack Oct. 6 by the Guerrilla Army of the Poor, which has been increasingly active in the past year. The guerrillas attacked a police detachment, killing 2 people, and municipal offices in Fraijanes. With a growth in guerrilla activity, rising labor militancy, and the unsettling violence in Nicaragua, the administration of Romeo Lucas Garcia is under pressure to "get tough." Hardliners within the government say Lucas has not acted quickly enough to stop the spreading unrest.

STRONG PRESIDENT

President Antonio Guzman of the Dominican Republic has moved decisively in his first 2 months in office to gain real **dom. republic** control over the government. Guzman was inaugurated Aug. 15, after 12 years of rule by Joaquin Balaguer, who passed several laws during his last months in power designed to hamstring the Guzman presidency (*IB*, Vol. V, No. 16). But to the surprise of many observers, Guzman has so far turned out to

be a strong president. Since his inauguration he has replaced nearly all the top, pro-Balaguer army and navy commanders with officers less likely to oppose change. Late last month he dismissed the army chief of staff, Gen. Enrique Perez y Perez, and appointed him ambassador to Spain. Perez y Perez has long been a dominant figure in Dominican politics. At the same time, Guzman made new appointments to important posts in the new government and began procedures aimed at cutting down corruption, which had become endemic under Balaguer. The new appointees are mainly wealthy executives and landowners, indicating the Guzman government is unlikely to seriously challenge the status quo.

Guzman has also set in motion plans to take over some land owned by U.S.-owned Gulf and Western Industries (G&W), which owns 267,000 acres in the Dominican Republic. No value has yet been put on the land. Opponents of the deal charge that G&W is giving up only land that is not fit for cultivation, but government spokespeople say the land is arable, and that it will form part of an agrarian reform aimed at making peasant families self-sufficient.

A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME

With this issue, your otherwise unchanged copy has a new masthead and title. After more than five and a half years as the *International Bulletin* published by Internews, we are now the *INTERNEWS International Bulletin*. Why such a momentous change? Actually, there is a good reason. Despite our success as a publication, we have always been better known as Internews. The name is shorter, snappier and easier to remember. Also, if you ever listened to our radio news reports you knew us as Internews. (We have discontinued our daily radio reports, but we will still be producing Internews radio commentaries and background reports from time to time.) And, if that's not reason enough, we should also say that our overall operation—the *Bulletin*, the radio service and our news gathering operation—is officially known as Internews. So, from now on, we're the *INTERNEWS International Bulletin*. Just call us Internews for short.

We would also like to thank two donors—in Boston and New York—who sent us generous, anonymous contributions in the past few weeks. We would like them to know that we very much appreciate their support.

And another note: thanks to Margot Nicolaus for the translations she regularly supplies to Internews.

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BRAZIL: Retired Gen. Joao Baptista Figueiredo was selected by Brazil's electoral college to be the country's next president. (AP 10/15) • **NICARAGUA:** Pres. Somoza, refusing to resign before his term ends in 1981, said that if the Carter administration wants him out of office, "they'd better come and get me." (Reuter 10/15) • **KENYA:** Kenya's new Pres. Daniel Arap Moi took office, pledging no change in Kenya's pro-western foreign policy. (Reuter 10/14) • **SOUTH AFRICA:** Squatter shacks were burned to the ground and hundreds of fleeing people were arrested in and around East London, during week-long raids by South African officials. (Johannesburg *Star* 10/7) • **ZAIRE:** In a further sign of reconciliation, Pres. Mobutu paid a 2-day visit to Angola, where he and Pres. Neto reached agreements on rail, air and sea traffic between their 2 countries. (Reuter 10/16) • **AID:** The House and Senate approved a \$7.3 billion foreign aid bill, containing \$1.8 billion for a special IMF fund known as the Witteveen facility, and cutting off aid to Mozambique and Angola. (Reuter 10/12-13) • **TUNISIA:** 2 prominent trade union leaders were sentenced to 10 years hard labor after being accused of attempting to overthrow the government during a 1-day general strike last Jan. in which at least 51 people were killed and hundreds injured. (Reuter 10/10) • **OIL:** Energy Sec. James Schlesinger said he does not think the U.S. will fulfill its pledge, made at the Bonn summit in July, to

reduce U.S. oil imports to 6 million barrels a day by 1985. (Reuter 10/11) OPEC countries warned that they may cut back on supplies of crude oil to the West if they are not allowed a bigger share of refining and petrochemical industries. (*Wall Street Journal* 10/10) • **BURMA:** Nearly 200,000 minority refugees who fled to Bangladesh from Burma last summer, bringing tales of rape, arson and torture, are refusing to return home. (*L.A. Times* 10/16) • **CAMBODIA:** 80 U.S. senators have urged Pres. Carter to take the issue of human rights in Cambodia before the UN. (Reuter 10/12) • **CHINA:** Wu Teh, the controversial mayor of Peking who was linked to the purged "gang of four" radical leaders, has been replaced. (*Washington Post* 10/11) • **JAPAN:** Masayoshi Ohira, Sec.-Gen. of Prime Minister Fukuda's ruling Liberal Democratic Party, has broken with Fukuda and announced he will run against him for the party leadership and the prime minister's post in Nov. (AP 10/16) • **EGYPT:** State Dept. planners think the U.S. may become Egypt's major arms supplier as an outcome of the Camp David Israeli-Egyptian peace accords. (*Aviation Week* 10/9) • **SYRIA:** A falloff in oil production since last year has led Syria to sign concession agreements recently with 2 U.S. oil firms and to seek bids for exploration and production contracts from other Western oil companies. (*Business Week* 10/16)

Southern Africa

[continued from page 1]

to join the five Western powers in urging that the UN proceed with its plan to hold elections in April under the protection of 7,500 UN peacekeeping troops. But at the same time, South Africa affirmed that it would hold its own unilateral election in Namibia Dec. 4-8. South Africa did not say it would abide by the later UN vote, but only that it would try to "persuade" representatives elected in December to cooperate with the UN in order to win international recognition. SWAPO, the UN-recognized liberation movement in Namibia, and two other political parties have already said they will boycott the South African-sponsored election.

South Africa's decision, announced October 19, to back away from outright rejection of the UN plan seems aimed at avoiding UN sanctions. The UN Security Council has set October 23 as the deadline for South African compliance. Meanwhile, SWAPO, which has strong local support, has vowed to intensify its small-scale guerrilla war.

If the Western plan for Namibia now appears in jeopardy, the Anglo-American proposal for a settlement of the much larger war in Rhodesia has never gotten off the ground. Smith's abrupt turnaround last week, saying that he would attend a conference with Patriotic Front guerrilla leaders, was counteracted almost immediately by Rhodesian raids into Zambia and Mozambique. And although guerrilla leaders Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo had previously agreed to attend U.S.- and British-sponsored talks, they may reconsider in light of the U.S. decision to allow Smith to tour the United States in violation of UN sanctions against Rhodesia. In Mozambique, Mugabe, the leader of ZANU, told the *Washington Post* October 9 that Smith's visit to the U.S. amounted to "tacit recognition" of his illegal regime. The United States is "no longer unbiased . . . no longer impartial," Mugabe said, warning that U.S. involvement in the Rhodesia negotiations might now be unacceptable.

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African nations at the UN also condemned Washington for granting a visa to Smith, and by a vote of 11-0 (with four Western nations abstaining) the Security Council rebuked the U.S. In an interview with *Time* October 9, Tanzania's influential President Julius Nyerere implored the U.S. to pressure Smith into a settlement, thereby shortening the war, which Nyerere said the guerrillas would inevitably win. "Don't try to be clever with Smith," Nyerere warned. "Deal with him on the ground he has chosen: power. Gather power and overthrow him."

Mozambique's Marxist President Samora Machel has recently taken a dimmer view of U.S. and other Western involvement, saying he feels betrayed by the Western powers with which he has tried to cooperate in bringing about a Rhodesia settlement. In a major policy statement released September 15 and printed in Tanzania's government-owned *Sunday News*, Machel said that Western countries have consistently tried to split the Patriotic Front while supporting Ian Smith for the time being "because Zimbabwe has not yet produced a neo-colonial leader with enough stature to be accepted by the Zimbabwean people and the world."

However, the militancy of Mozambique and Tanzania is not representative of the "frontline" states as a whole, as evidenced by Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda's decision to reopen his country's border with Rhodesia on October 6—the day Smith left for New York. Taken against the advice of Nyerere and Machel, Kaunda's decision was a boost for Smith and was immediately interpreted by the South African government as reflecting a split within the frontline countries. Kaunda had closed the border with Rhodesia in 1973 in solidarity with the Zimbabwean guerrillas fighting Smith's white-minority regime. But since then he has come under increasing political and economic pressure to rescind that order. Plunging copper prices (Zambia's main export), congestion on the Tanzam railroad and in the port of Dar Es Salaam, soaring inflation, shortages of goods, and an immediate need for fertilizer prompted Kaunda to re-open the border, although he says trade with Rhodesia will still be forbidden.

During his campaigning in the U.S., Smith emphasized his regime's announcement October 10 that it was abolishing all statutory racial discrimination. However, U.S. press reports noted that the opening up of schools, hospitals and housing to blacks will not mean much in practice since the vast majority of the country's 6.7 million blacks cannot afford to take

advantage of the new opportunities. The average annual income of whites is \$9,240, more than 11 times the \$830 average black income. Rowan Cronje, the white co-minister for education and health, told reporters that the old racial restrictions are now being replaced by "monetary discrimination."

One of the most significant aspects of Smith's two-week media blitz was the strong support he generated from leading Republicans. He met with Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan and Nelson Rockefeller, among others. On the other hand, Smith was almost universally condemned by blacks, including the Congressional Black Caucus and TRANSAFRICA, the black lobbying group which organized a demonstration of some 1,000 people in front of the White House Oct. 9. Although he was squirmed about by rightwingers such as novelist Robin Moore (*The Green Berets*) and appeared first before the conservative American Security Council in Virginia, Smith was able to reach a very broad audience through television and press interviews. His supporters hope that he laid the groundwork for a congressional push at the end of the year to get Carter to lift sanctions against Rhodesia.

—STEVE TALBOT

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